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Abstract: 
Kent Bach has argued that certain traditional problems of action theory (concerning the individuation of actions, 
their timing, their location, and the manner in which they enter into causal relations) arise only on the 
supposition that actions are events, and he has argued further that actions are not events. In this paper these 
arguments are examined and rejected. 
 
Article: 
I 
―I flip the switch, turn on the light, and illuminate the room. Unbeknownst to me I also alert a prowler to the 
fact that I am home.‖ Of this case Donald Davidson confidently asserts that the agent performed just one action, 
of which four different descriptions have been given.
1 
Others, however, have maintained that at least four 
distinct actions were performed.
2 
This is the problem of how actions are to be individuated. Call it Problem A.  
 
―Suppose a man is shot, fatally, in January. Suppose then, not knowing that the wound is fatal, he goes south, to 
Miami, in hope of recuperating. And suppose this does him no good: he dies in June.‖ Judith Thomson claims 
that the killing occurred from January to June.
3 
Others have denied this.
4 
This is the problem of when actions 
may be said to take place. Call it Problem B.  
 
There are many other similar problems in the theory of action to which philosophers have paid attention, such 
as the problems (C) where actions may be said to take place, (D) how actions may be said to enter into causal 
relations, and the like. I mention Problems A—D in particular, though, for it has recently been argued that they, 
at least, are not genuine problems at all. If this argument passes inspection it is surely very important. For then 
the work of past action theorists will prove to have been badly misguided (insofar as they have taken Problems 
A—D seriously) and that of future action theorists considerably simplified (insofar as they need not grapple 
with these problems). The argument in question has been proposed by Kent Bach.
5 
It is his contention (p. 117) 
that Problems A—D ―arise only on the supposition that actions are events‖, and, while this may be a natural 
supposition
6 
, it is nonetheless, according to Bach, a false one. The significance of its implications for the work 
of action theorists renders Bach‘s argument deserving of careful scrutiny. It is the purpose of this paper to 
provide such scrutiny.  
 
One way to try to argue that actions are not events is to deny that events, and therefore actions, exist. Some 
philosophers have indeed taken this tack.
7 
But this is not what Bach does. On the contrary, Bach accepts that 
events exist. It seems to me prudent of him that he should do so. While anyone with a penchant for ontological 
parsimony would be suspicious of their existence, there are nonetheless powerful reasons for accepting that they 
do exist.
8 
At any rate, caution in matters ontological requires at least a provisional acceptance of the existence of 
events. What makes Bach‘s argument so interesting is that he accepts the existence of events and yet denies that 
actions are events.  
 
Another way to argue that actions are not events is to develop a detailed theory of events and then to point out 
that, perhaps surprisingly, actions turn out not to be events on this theory. This is not what Bach does either. On 
the contrary, Bach simply says the following with respect to the nature of events (p. 115): ―I will make an 
assumption common to most theories, and beyond that rely on the reader‘s pretheoretic intuitions about events. I 
assume that events exist in space and time and that they enter into causal relations as causes and as effects.‖ Let 
us now examine his argument. 
 
II 
Bach contends that to act is to bring about an event. Actions are therefore to be treated as instances of the 
relation of bringing about whose terms are agents and events. Bach distinguishes two main theories concerning 
the nature of bringing about. According to the Agency Theory, bringing about is an irreducible relation between 
agents and events.
9 
According to the Causal Theory, which Bach himself favors
10 
, bringing about may be 
reduced, on analysis, to a causal relation between one event and another event. All of this seems right. Why 
should it lead us to believe that actions are not events and that A—D are not genuine problems?  
 
Let us begin with what Bach has to say about the Agency Theory. While he discusses this theory only briefly 
(his main concern is the Causal Theory), nonetheless what he has to say about it is important, since the Agency 
Theory is a legitimate rival to the Causal Theory.  
 
As noted, the Agency Theory claims that action involves an agent‘s bearing a special relation to an event. This 
relation—often called the relation of agent-causation—is special in that it admits of no reduction to any other 
relation; it is unanalyzable; it is sui generis. Agency Theorists have traditionally insisted on the irreducibility of 
this relation for one or the other (or both) of two closely related reasons. The first reason is that they have feared 
that the reducibility of the relation (in particular, its reducibility, as on the Causal Theory, to a causal relation 
between events) would imply that agency is in some way not genuine; that is, that ―actions‖ would turn out to 
be events that happen to ―agents‖, so that ―agents‖ would be passive rather than genuinely active. The second 
reason is that they have feared that the reducibility of the relation would imply that agents, even if somehow 
genuinely active, would not be in control of their actions; that is, freedom of action would be impossible.  
 
Bach states (p.117) that the Agency Theory entails that actions are not events, but he doesn‘t say why. Perhaps 
he has in mind this remark made by Roderick Chisholm, the most prominent contemporary Agency Theorist: 
 
We have said that there must be some event A, presumably some cerebral event, which is caused not by 
any other event, but by the agent. Since A was not caused by any other event, then the agent himself 
cannot be said to have undergone any change or produced any other event…which brought A about. But 
if, when the agent made A happen, there was no event involved other than A itself,…what did the 
agent‘s causation consist of?… The only answer…can be this…. There was a brain event A; the agent 
did, in fact, cause the brain event; but there was nothing that he did to cause it.
11  
 
This passage suggests the following argument
12 
. 
 
(1) If someone, S, acts, then there is some event A such that S agent-causes A. 
 
(2) If S agent-causes A, then no event causes A. 
 
Hence 
 
(3) If someone, S, acts, then there is some event A such that S agent-causes A and there is no event involved 
in the act other than A itself. 
 
This is, of course, a non sequitur. While it may be that no event causes A, there may nonetheless be an event 
involved in the act other than A itself. In particular, it may be that the act, namely, S‘s agent-causing A, is itself 
an event. Indeed, it is hard to see how this could plausibly be denied. If nothing else happens when S agent-
causes A other than A itself, then it would seem that S‘s agent-causing A is identical with A; but this must be 
rejected, since a person‘s bringing about an event cannot be thought to be identical with that event. However, if 
something else does happen, then (it seems—but see the next paragraph) some event other than A does occur; 
and if no event causes A, the obvious candidate for this other event is S‘s agent-causing A.  
 
One might try nonetheless to support Bach‘s contention that the Agency Theory entails that actions are not 
events in either of two ways. First, one might insist that events involve a change in some individual and that S‘s 
agent-causing A, even if it happens and hence is an occurrence of some sort, involves no change (in S or 
anything else) and hence is not an event. This is hard to assess. While some theorists have certainly contended 
that events essentially involve change, contrasting them with states
13 
, it is not clear that we should accept this. 
(If someone keeps perfectly still, is this not an action? If so, and if Bach is right, then some event is brought 
about. What event? Presumably that of the agent‘s being perfectly still. But what change in the agent does this 
involve?
14 
) Moreover, what reason do we have to say that S‘s agent-causing A involves no change in S? 
Certainly we must agree (if the Agency Theory is to be preserved) that no change in S causes A, but this doesn‘t 
imply that no change in S occurs. The second way to try to support Bach‘s contention here is to invoke his 
claim that events enter into causal relations as causes and effects and to interpret this as meaning that all events 
are both causes of other events and caused by other events. This might well rule out S‘s agent-causing A as an 
event; for Agency Theorists (such as Chisholm) frequently claim that actions are not event-caused, and this 
surely implies that S‘s agent-causing A is not event-caused. The trouble is, this move would also rule out A as 
an event, contrary to the initial assumption of the Agency Theorist.  
 
The foregoing is, of course, very obscure, the obscurity being inherited directly from the obscurity of the notion 
of irreducible agent-causation itself. No Agency Theorist that I know of has been able to dispel the mystery 
surrounding this concept. Still, this much can, I think, be said: it is not at all obvious that, as Bach claims, the 
Agency Theory entails that actions are not events. On the contrary, Chisholm himself seems later to have 
accepted that they are events. While in the passage cited (first published in 1964) Chisholm may seem to 
intimate that actions are not events, in later writings (published in 1971 and 1976) he seems to intimate that they 
are events. For in these writings he subscribes to the view that, if S agent-causes A, then S agent-causes his 
agent-causing A.
15  
 
III 
More important is to assess what Bach has to say about the Causal Theory and its implications regarding actions 
as events, for two reasons. First, the Causal Theory has enjoyed much broader support among philosophers than 
the Agency Theory; and second, Bach‘s argument in this regard is much more detailed and explicit.  
 
According to the Causal Theory, acting consists in a mental event‘s causing another event (often a physical 
event). For example, raising one‘s arm might be said to involve a decision to raise one‘s arm causing one‘s arm 
to rise. Such a theory may appear to be better suited to support Bach‘s contention that actions are not events, 
inasmuch as it implies that, when an agent brings about an event, some event occurs that is distinct both from 
the event brought about and from the bringing about of that event; hence, on the Causal Theory, even if one 
wishes to maintain that actions are not events, there is no danger (as on the Agency Theory) of being committed 
to the apparent absurdity of saying that, when someone acts, nothing happens other than the event that is 
brought about.  
 
Bach suggests several arguments as to why actions are not events. First, he says this (p.117): 
 
[W]e need not accept the Agency Theory, which entails that actions are not events, rather than the 
Causal Theory, which reduces the relation of bringing about to a causal relation between pairs of events. 
Even supposing that actions are causings, it does not follow that actions are events. Indeed,…one 
event‘s causing another is not itself an event…. 
 
Thus we have this argument: 
(1) All actions are causings. 
(2) No causing is an event. 
 
Hence 
 
(3) No action is an event. 
 
Given the Causal Theory, the first premise must be accepted. But why accept the second? Bach says this (pp. 
117–8): 
 
Clearly we cannot identify the causing with either the cause or the effect, and even if we suppose that 
these two events combine to form a composite event, it is odd, to say the least, to describe that 
composite event as the causing of one event by another (or even as the following of one event by 
another). 
 
But this won‘t do. Suppose that some mental event, M, causes some physical event, P. Do these events 
―combine‖ to form a third, composite event? I find it plausible to say that they do. We may call this event M-
and-P. (We certainly appear to recognize the existence of composite events in many cases. We give them 
names, such as ―battle‖ and ―tornado‖. It is arguable that every causally related sequence of events involves 
such composite events.) I think that we should also agree with Bach that M-and-P is not the same thing as M-
causing-P. After all, M-and-P itself appears to involve no causal relation between M and P but merely their 
conjunction. But of course it does not follow from this, contrary to Bach‘s apparent suggestion, that M-causing-
P is not itself an event. Why think that it is not? Here Bach gives no explicit reason, but he does cite the work of 
N. L. Wilson. So let us look at what Wilson has to say.  
 
The passage by Wilson to which Bach makes reference is very brief. It is this: ―But the causing of e2 by e1 is not 
itself an event. (What could it cause? Not e2!)‖
16 
This suggests the following argument: 
 
(1) All events can have (or, perhaps, do have) effects. 
(2) No causing can have an effect. 
 
Hence 
 
      (3) No causing is an event. 
 
Let us grant the first premise (for argument‘s sake). Let us also grant that the causing of e2 by e1 does not itself 
cause e2. This of course does not imply that the causing of e2 by e1 has no effect whatsoever. We have not been 
given any reason to accept the second premise.  
 
Now, none of the foregoing provides a positive reason for saying that causings are events; it has merely been 
critical of the reasons given for the claim that they are not. But if we follow Bach and say simply that events 
exist in space and time and enter into causal relations, I think we can provide a positive reason for saying that 
causings are events. For it seems that, contrary to Wilson‘s claim, causings may indeed enter into causal 
relations. Suppose that Smith is taking an introductory course in metaphysics. Before taking the course he never 
contemplated the existence of causings. The instructor assures him, however, that such things do exist. 
Sceptical, Smith looks for one and is surprised to find one involved in that series of events that constitutes one 
billiard ball‘s striking another and causing it to roll into the corner pocket. It seems accurate to say that the 
causing itself causes Smith‘s surprise. It may be retorted that it is Smith‘s finding the causing that causes his 
surprise. I would grant this but reply in turn that the causing causes his finding it and thereby also causes his 
surprise. If this is correct, causings can and sometimes do themselves enter into causal relations.
17  
 
Another reason for thinking that actions are not events is presented by Bach in the following passage (p.119): 
Instances are not individuals and not subject to quantification. Imagine the silliness of a debate over 
whether, in the case of a red, round ball, there is one instance or two. There is an instance of redness and 
an instance of roundness, but one and the same individual, the ball, is an instance of both. 
 
This suggests the following argument: 
 
(1) All actions are instances (of the relation of bringing about). 
(2) No instance is an event (for events are quantifiable individuals, while instances are not). 
 
Hence 
 
(3) No action is an event. 
 
Here, I think, Bach confounds two senses of ―instance‖. In one sense, an instance is a thing which instantiates; it 
is an instantiator. In another sense, an instance is an episode of instantiation; it is an instantiating. In the 
example given, there is (fairly clearly) just one instantiator, the ball; it instantiates both redness and roundness. 
How many instantiatings there are is a moot point. Identity theorists would claim that there is just one 
instantiating involved, although it falls under several descriptions.
18 
Fine-grained theorists would say that there 
are several distinct instantiatings involved, including those of an instantiating of redness and an instantiating of 
roundness.
19 
In neither sense of ―instance‖, let it be noted, does there appear to be reason to think that instances 
are not quantifiable individuals.  
 
In which sense of ―instance‖ are actions instances of the relation of bringing about? Clearly, it cannot be the 
first (although the passage just cited strongly suggests that Bach has just this sense in mind). Actions don‘t 
instantiate the relation; agents, and the events brought about, do that. (Of course, actions can be instantiators; 
for example, a kind action instantiates kindness. It is just that actions don‘t instantiate the relation of bringing 
about.) Actions are, rather, instances of the relation of bringing about in the sense that they are instantiatings of 
it; they are what happens when the relation is instantiated. Now, it seems clear that instantiatings can be events; 
indeed, if some theorists are right, all events are instantiatings.
20 
Thus the second premise of the argument just 
attributed to Bach cannot be sustained. I submit that the reason that he apparently subscribes to the premise is 
that, failing to notice the confusion of senses of ―instance‖, he feels drawn to say, with respect to the case cited, 
both that there is just one instance and that there are two. Since this cannot be correct, he concludes that 
instances are non-existent—they are mere façons de parler- and hence that, since actions are instances, they too 
are mere façons de parler. But this conclusion is unwarranted.  
 
Bach hints, however, at another reason for thinking that actions do not exist. Immediately after the passage just 
quoted, he says (p. 119): 
 
Rather than get mixed up in such a debate [over the number of instances at issue], we can simply say 
that one individual, the ball, is an instance of both properties, that is, that the ball is red and round. 
Similarly, we need not worry about individuation in the case of actions, construed as instances of the 
relation of bringing about between agents and events. Since an action is performed if and only if 
someone has brought about an event, we need not count actions but only agents and events. 
 
And he adds in a note (p. 119): ―Metalinguistically, the claim is that expressions of the form ‗A‘s bringing 
about e,‘ as well as gerundive forms of action verbs generally, do not refer.‖  
 
This suggests the following argument: 
 
(1) All actions (at least on the Causal Theory) are reducible to other entities. 
(2) If something is reducible to something else, the former is not a real existent. 
(3) All events are real existents. 
Hence 
 
      (4) No action is an event. 
 
The second premise of this argument is unacceptable. Bach fails to distinguish reduction from elimination.
21 
For 
example, there is presumably no such thing as the average table; any apparent reference to such an entity is 
merely apparent. Anyone who accepts this is an eliminativist with respect to the average table. But most of us 
would accept that normal, everyday tables are genuine existents and so are not eliminativists with respect to 
them. Reference to (non-fictitious) tables, we believe, is genuine reference. And this is true even if we believe 
that tables may be reduced, in some sense, to their parts—their tops and legs, perhaps—together with some 
spatial relation between these items. Similarly, Causal Theorists are of the opinion that actions may be reduced, 
in some sense, to agents and events together with some causal relation between these items. Acceptance of this, 
however, does not warrant the inference that actions don‘t exist. Reduction is one thing, elimination quite 
another. The final sentence in the passage just quoted from Bach seems to me as bizarre as saying this: since a 
goal is scored if and only if someone puts the ball in the net, we need not count goals but only people and balls 
and nets. 
 
IV 
Bach has therefore failed to give us sound reason for rejecting the common supposition of action theorists that 
actions are events. Of course, this does not imply that his thesis that they are not events is false. For all that I 
have said, it might be that actions are subject not just to reduction but to elimination. Some people claim that 
tables are not genuine existents, and it may be that the same may be said of actions. But in the absence of a 
cogent argument for this view, it seems prudent to accept the existence of actions. In particular, it is very hard to 
see just how one might cogently argue that actions do not exist while accepting, as Bach does, that events do 
exist.
22  
 
Also, for all that I have said, it might be that actions, like events, do exist, but that actions are not events. My 
main purpose here has been to show that Bach has not given us good reason to think that actions are not events, 
especially if, following Bach, we simply say of events that they exist in space and time and enter into causal 
relations. But suppose now that we conceded that actions are not events but entities of some other sort. (This is 
certainly arguable, I suppose; for even if we accept that all actions are occurrences of some sort, since it seems 
that not all occurrences are events
23 
, it may yet be that actions are not events.) What impact would this have on 
traditional theory of action? Very little, I think. For the problems that Bach mentions—problems A—D above—
and others too (such as how to distinguish intentional from unintentional action, how to distinguish action from 
omission, and the like) would still remain, whether or not we take actions to be events. The problem of 
individuation arises whenever an individual existent is posited. Bach‘s remark that Problem A arises only on the 
assumption that actions are events is thus simply mistaken. Similarly, any non-instantaneous occurrence, 
whether an event or not, endures; hence Problem B remains. Problem C, concerning location, besets any 
occurrence that (literally) takes place. And, if actions can enter into causal relations, Problem D remains, 
whether or not actions are events. Moreover, it is these problems on which theorists have focussed; the 
assumption that actions are events has for the most part not played an essential role in their theorizing. Of 
course, if, as Bach maintains, actions do not exist at all, then, as he says, A—D are merely pseudo-problems. 
But he has not succeeded in showing that they do not exist. And as long as we accept that actions are genuine 
occurrences, genuine instantiatings of the relation of bringing about, then Problems A—D must be tackled 
head-on, whether or not actions are events.
24 
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